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Alternatives to Monarchical Centralisation:
The Great Tradition of Revolt in Flanders and Brabant
One of the first deeds of the revolutionary magistrale which took power in Ghent
on the Ist of November 1577, was to propose to the city of Brussels to revive the alli-
ance made by Flanders and Brabant in 13391. This was concluded at the time when
King Edward III was seeking support in the Low Countries in his struggle for the
kingdom of France. Ghent, and the other leading towns of Flanders rejected the au-
thority of their count and took sides with the king of England. It was in Ghent that
Edward took the title of king of France, and that the Flemings recognised him as their
sovereign2.
The reference made in 1577 to these events concerns a whole political programme
which the city authorities of Ghent proposed to the States General in May 1579, to be
implemented if the peace negotiations with the King of Spain at Cologne were not
successful3. The general tendency of this programme was the formation of a city-state
System, bringing the whole county of Flanders under the control of the three great
cities Ghent, Bruges and Ypres.
Ghent prescribed in its own quarter
- the abolition of autonomous rural districts,
- the creation of a council of representatives of the towns to decide in matters of state,
war and public order,
- the reservation for Ghent of one third of the votes in the appointment of aldermen
in the smaller towns.
After the introduction of this political System in the quarter of Ghent, it would be
recommended for introduction in the three other quarters of the county. At the same
time, the socalled Calvinist Republic of Ghent restored the medieval corporative or-
ganization which Charles V had abolished af ter a revolt in 1540.
This model of government elaborated experiences repeatedly made in the history of
the Netherlands during the 14th and 15th centuries, and even earlier and was ex-
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tended by the claim that the people had the right to choose their prince and to limit
his authority with specific conditions for his rule4.
Since human innovations often take place in the mental context of references to ex-
amples in the past, it seems important to have a look at the precedents for this rejec-
tion of monarchical authority. The current expression of "chose publique" or "res pub-
lica" which had for a long time been part of the rhetoric of royal chanceries, now be-
came the prerogative of the representatives of the people only. We will pay special at-
tention to Flanders and Brabant not only because they both offer interesting traditions
of rejection or reduction of monarchical power, but also because they were the leading
principalities in the Netherlands up to the early years of the Revolt. As an indication
of this weight, it is sufficient to point to the division of the taxes, established by the
States General. Flanders usually paid 34% of the bürden, Brabant about 29%, Holland
and Zeeland together between 15% and 17%, Guelders 12%, and the other much
less5.
In this respect, it is hardly surprising that it was the city of Ghent that gave the ex-
ample of the abrogation of the authority of King Philip II as early as the 6th of August
1579, two years before the Generality did so6. Since the king had refused to accept rea-
sonable conditions for peace, his sovereignty was said to have devolved upon the city
magistrale. This Interpretation went even further than that of the States General in
1581, which still provided for a new prince and lord (not for a sovereign, given the re-
strictions imposed on the monarchical power for the future); hè had to be chosen by
themselves and to be held to well defined rules and controls. It was no accident that
even this famous Act of Abrogation was written by a Brabantine lawyer who could
refer to the long Brabantine "constitutional" tradition7.
I shall now first discuss the type of legitimation offered by the monarchs in their ne-
gotiations with the representative institutions, and then look for the paths along which
these latter developed alternative views. The legitimation of its power offered by the
monarchy was absolutely conventional. In his emotional speeches to the States of
Flanders in 1470 and 1475, Charles the Bold presented himself as the biblical "Good
4
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Shepherd" and father, who treats bis subjects with love, but who is severe when they
disobey8 The mention that the Shepherd sacnfices his hfe for his flock resounds m
the words of Charles the Bold äs well äs in those of Philip II both say that the only
sacnfice they did not yet provide for their subjects was, in fact, their own hfe As is
well known, Charles the Bold died on the battlefield before Nancy Smce every subject
can address directly the monarch to obtam his nght, Charles considered mtermediary
mstitutions such as the town magistrates and the States merely äs impediments for an
efficiënt government, they claimed authonty over revenues which m fact were denved
from monarchical prerogatives Instead of treatmg with them, which always had re-
sulted m reluctant and belated aids, the duke wished to admmister everythmg him-
self9
In a discourse before the States General m 1473, chancellor Hugonet equally con-
sidered it convenient to offer a legitimation of the monarchy Followmg the late me-
dieval commonplace, he discerned three forms of government that by the commu-
nity, by the anstocracy ("par certam nombre de vertueux") and monarchy This is the
most "utile, plus expedient et plus fructueuse" because it provides the best "concord-
ance" in governmg The metaphor of the human body and the reference to the one
and only allmighty God were the positive arguments the chancellor could mention
The monarch and the subjects should stnve together for "le commun bien de la chose
pubhque"10 In this short sentence, we find jomed two expressions which got specific
significations m later een tunes the common wealth and the repubhc From the 14th
to the 16th centunes, however, they were both used m a very general sense, both by
the monarchs and by the representatives of the subjects In 1552 for mstance,
Charles V called the Pragmatic Sanction of Augsburg "une ceuvre si nécessaire et salu-
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taire a toute la Republique Chrestienne"11. As a legitimation of monarchical power, all
this sounded very conventional, and in accordance with the legacy of Aristotle, trans-
mitted through the Arabs to Western Christendom. In similar speeches by Chancellor
Gattinara in the States General in 1520 and 1521, references were made to Caesar, Oc-
tavian and other Roman emperors who were praised for their clemency and sweetness.
Following their example, Ernperor Charles V "veult estre non seullement Roy et seig-
neur, mais pere, protecteur, deffenseur et liberateur": the paternalistic view already ex-
pressed fifty years earlier by his great-grandfather duke Charles the Bold. The same ar-
guments and themes continued to be used to underpin the monarchical authority in
the States General12. In 1540, right after the repression of the Ghent revolt, Charles
was presented again as the clement upholder of law and order: hè had to "mectre
l'ordre pour l'advenir au bon gouvernement et administracion des affaires publiques
(res publica) desdits pays, tout au fait de la justice que la police d'iceulx pays"13.
The image of the human body was used again in 1542 to urge the representatives in
the States General to stay united during the emperor's absence, ("conioinctz comme
tous estans membres d'ung corps soubz ung chief et pere"14). The theme of the pater-
nal affection was repeated from Charles the Bold to Philip II. Even when from 1540
onwards, the notions "bon prince", "bon gouvernement" and "bonne administration"
appear frequently, their content remained purely conventional: "la quietude et tran-
quillite de ces pays", "la bonne et paternelle affection que sa majesté a tousiours porté
ausdiz pays et subiectz".
Philip II again presents himself as the good and loving father providing protection
against an evil enemy: "faict (pour la preservation et protection de ses pays et sujets)
tout ce que ung bon prince desirans se montrer vray pere de ses subiectz vouldra et
polroit faire"15.
This review of the legitimation of the monarchy, as it was presented to the members
of the States General, shows an entirely traditional and immobile view on the exercise
of power. It did not provide for any old or new tendencies in the society claiming a
more pluralistic political system. The monarch is a good and loving father who some-
times has to castigate his ungrateful children.
On the other side, real day-to-day problems taught the subjects how to oppose ex-
travagant monarchical power. Of course, circumstances could favour or prevent the
development of civil rights. In the duchy of Brabant, the dynasties had to face an ex-
traordinary level of discontinuity: from 1261 to 1430, 8 out of the 9 successions to the
throne created serious difficulties because the heir was minor or linked to a foreign dy-
nasty. Moreover, financial difficulties of the duchy added to the opportunities for the
subjects to intervene. A clear case was the succession by Duke John III. His father
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could foresee the difficulties since in bis will of 1312, just bef ore bis death he installed
a council of regents for bis twelve years old heir. However, the debts left by the duke
created such immense trouble for the international trade of the Brabanters, that the
representatives of Antwerp organised a coalition of the towns and of the nobility to get
a firmer grip on the government. In 1314, the towns managed to get control over the
finances of the duchy by offering an aid to resolve the urgent needs but, at the same
time, by themselves taking care of the payments to the duke's creditors. They imposed
a new council of regents, in which the towns had at least an equal number of members
as the nobles. And, most remarkable of all, they could prolong the official minority of
the duke for another six years, so that it lasted from 1312 to 1320, when John III was
already 20 years old16. As it is well known that the usual age of majority was 14 or 15,
the postponement up to the age of 20 was a drastic infringement of the duke's prerog-
atives. The financial difficulties left by the former duke explain the necessity of a pro-
longed period of stabilisation. Nevertheless, the regency offered opportunities for the
cities to govern during six years, to appoint officers, to use the duke's seal and all his
other rights.
Of course, this Situation was an emergency, and the regency did not deny the duke's
right to take over the government when the problems would be cleared. But their au-
tonomous decision to continue the regency was legitimised by the "common interest",
an argument the burghers could now use in their own - often private - interest.
Although John III proved to be a cunning and firm duke, his succession created
anew a constitutional problem. Again, the great cities took initiatives which went far
beyond the rules of traditional monarchy. John III died on the 5th of December 1355.
His principal heir was a daughter, married to Wenceslas, count of Luxemburg and
brother of emperor Charles IV. The will included secret stipulations giving parts of the
duchy as apanages to the duke's younger daughters; thus, the important towns of Ant-
werp and Mechelen would pass into the hands of the count of Flanders who was mar-
ried to Margaret of Brabant. The cities were firmly opposed to this partition of the ter-
ritory and also feared foreign interventions in the government.
What followed could be the plot of a thrilling novel. Representatives of the city of
Louvain - the oldest of the duchy - brought the duke's archives within their walls, and
adapted a tower of Saint Peter's church as a fortified room to keep them. Three keys
were made for the ehest in which the charts were kept: one for the duchess, another
for the city of Brussels, and the third for the city of Louvain. The latter city, however,
was the sole holder of the keys of the gate leading to the archives17.
Meanwhile, the dead duke's body was not buried. This meant that no succession was
possible and that the power could be legitimately exercised by others in the name of
the late John III. We find here an early example of the medieval theory that the King
16
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embodies public authonty and therefore never dies As long as there is a body of a
ruler the government can thus be exercised m his name18
Agam, the burghers managed to prolong the power vacuüm m order to obtam the
guarantees they wanted A first step was the concession, on the 3rd of January 1356, of
a long charter, the famous "Blijde Incomst" or "Joyeuse Entree" It was not sealed,
however, before the 20th of February, when Joan and Wenceslas held their Entry in
Louvam Only then was her father's body buned, two and a half months after his
death It is obvious that the towns used all the means at their disposal to get their view
accepted and to enlarge their mfluence They built up a tradition of interference m
government and m postponmg the recogmtion of their dukes until their conditions
had been met Although the Inauguration Charter was formally invalidated smce Au-
gust of the same year 1356, similar texts where conceded at every succession in Bra-
bant until 179419
A third occasion m which the Brabantme towns, supported by the larger part of the
nobihty, took effective power occured when duke Anthony was killed m the battle of
Agmcourt, m 1415 His eldest son, John, was not yet thirteen The ^ States of Brabant
immediately took over the government, took all the measures for the funeral, recog-
mzed John as the successor to the throne and installed a Regency council of eleven
members, two prelates, five noblemen and representatives of each of the four major
cities Withm the two first weeks of November 1415, the States created a government
responsible to them and actmg m the name of the duke The States firmly resisted
claims by John's uncle Duke John the Fearless of Burgundy, to the exercise of the re-
gency and by the Roman King Sigismund who claimed that the duchy had fallen to
him smce 1405 The Regency Council provided for the normal government in all its
aspects The States kept a firm control by prescnbmg that all acts issued by the duke
should be sealed in the presence of four councillors at least, whose names were to be
mentioned m the act In this way, the States mtroduced the System of the responsibil-
ity of the councillors towards the representation of the subjects20 After two years, the
duke was near to reach his fifteenth anmversary Clearly pushed by one councillor be-
longmg to the lower nobihty, hè tned to get nd of the control by the regents and the
States He succeeded with the former, not with the latter Confhcts arose between m-
dividual barons and cities on the one hand, and the duke or his court on the other
The loss of Holland and Zeeland, in which duke John IV had acquiesced notwith-
standmg an aid granted by the States to recover them, provoked Indignation In May
1420, the city of Louvam summoned the other towns and several nobles They drafted
a hst of gnevances agamst the government, for which the duke's councillors were held
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responsible. The States considered themselves empowered to initiate a trial for in-
fringements against the Inauguration Charter and the Regency stipulations. The com-
plaints against the bad councillors were simply refuted by the duke: he considered
them responsible only to himself. He equally dismissed the claims by the States for
control of the expenditure of the aids, of financial policy and of the nomination of
high officers.
After several months of sharp confrontations, the duke fled from Brussels on the
30th of September 1420, which opened the opportunity for the States to call upon his
younger brother, Philip of Saint-Pol, to act as regent. Again, the States held "evil coun-
cillors" responsible for bad government and evil advice to the duke. Again, the States
took over all the responsibilities and prerogatives, such as raising troops and nominal -
ing officers. The regent had agreed to rule with füll respect for the privileges and to
follow the advice of councillors appointed by the States. After two attempts to get con-
trol in Brussels, which failed mainly because of populär uprisings against John IV and
his patrician partisans, the duke had to submit entirely to the conditions of the States
on the 4th of May 1421. He had to subscribe to the principle that the States could law-
fully refuse any service to the duke and choose a regent in his place in the case that,
and as long as, the duke infringed any rights or privileges of the three States or any of
their separate members.
Confrontations during the following years showed the firm intention of the barons
and towns to keep the control they had gained21.
It is obvious that none of these cases shows any republican thought: always, the bar-
ons, cities and States acted in the name of the prince. Materially, they had nevertheless
been building up a tradition of self-government in periods when they judged it neces-
sary. This mentality is to be considered as the necessary precondition of republicanism
and was surely not less radical than any political theories of its time.
During the period of continuously strong ducal power between 1430 and 1476,
however, their positions became much less provocative. The fact that the barons acted
in coalition with the major cities, and that the assembly of the three States played an
active role, foreshadows a similar configuration in the 16th Century. It offers a contrast
with Flanders where the three major cities were much more predominant.
If we now turn to the county of Flanders, we also find a series of periods of several
years each during which the large cities set aside the monarch and exercised the gov-
ernment themselves. Four general uprisings were directed against the monarchical
power from the early 14th Century to the Revolt of the late 16th, covering together 23
years in a period lasting roughly 260 years: a proportion of l to 11. Moreover, 4 major
revolts covered each one of the quarters of the county, involving one of the leading
towns. Taken together, these regional revolts lasted about 14 years. If one adds to these
large movements the recurrent local uprisings, the intensity of social protest appears to
have been extraordinarily high. Social movements directed against the monarch oc-
cured on average once in seven years, a frequency which, like that of the bad harvests,
21
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must have lef t lts impnnts on people's mmds The longest intervals lasted 41 and 45
years, each of them followmg a particularly heavy and long conflict
The collective expenences of the populations m their struggles with rulers created a
pattern of social action, provided models and a programme Many revolts were aimed
indeed at the undoing of previous acts of monarchical centrahsaüon In 1577, the
"Ghent Repubhc" first of all wanted to abohsh the shameful hmitations of the urban
autonomy, Charles V had imposed m 1540 Hembyze and his followers wanted even to
achieve the return to the medieval status of the city, meanmg by this the corporative
organization and the practice of city-states which had existed durmg the earher revolu-
tionary periods22
The Ghent Repubhc thus was linked to the cham of Flemish revolts which were all
l mspired by the same alternative to monarchical centralisation a state organization
l based on the autonomous power of the great cities, controlhng each a quarter of the
county This control extended to fiscal military, jundical, economie and, from 1578
onwards, also to religious matters Such was the pattern of the revolt of the peasants m
Western Flanders, supported by Bruges from 1323 to 1328, of James van Artevelde's
pohcy m the years around 134023 of that of his son Philip fourty years later, and that of
all the subsequent revolutionär/ regimes durmg the Burgundian and Habsburg re-
gimes During each of the revolts of Bruges (1436-38) and Ghent (1447-53 and 1537-
40) separately, and of the whole county under their direction m 1477 and 1482-92,
the same model of state power was put forward It rested on the dommation by the
three major cities of their respective hmterlands, within which representative struc-
tures were allowed withm the boundanes of the self-mterest of the capitals The "quar-
ters" of the county formed a federation where decisions were necessanly taken m the
localiües, m a similar way, the leadmg towns could enter mto other federations such as
the States General of the Netherlands or, more temporanly, commercial networks In
all these cases, a monarch was recogmzed24
Count Louis of Nevers was recognized by the revolutionary government of James of
Artevelde, as long as hè corroborated the city's pohcy So, the count was forced to
agree with the alliance between Flanders and Brabant, concluded m his presence on
the 3rd of December 1339 He fled from his county the day after, and when the rup-
ture seemed irreparable in 1342, Artevelde provided a regent m the person of Simon
de Mirabelle, an Itahan banker at Ghent who was marned to a half-sister of the
count25 Durmg the revolt of 1379-85, when the relations with the count were again
broken, his legitimacy was respected in the person of his son-m-law and future succes-
sor, duke Philip the Bold of Burgundy
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In 1477, the States General and the States of Flanders, Brabant and the other pnnci-
pahties, recognised Mary as duchess without any problem, since she was prepared to
accept reforms m the state structure and an effective participation by the estates m
power26 Durmg the revolts of the years from 1482 to 1492, the Flemmgs refused
Maximilian of Austria the regency because they had learned to know him as an auto-
crat, trymg to abohsh their chenshed privileges newly formulated m 1477 They found
no difficulty m creatmg a Regency Council, emanating from the three States and to
govern the county durmg nearly eight years m the name of the young Philip the
Fair27
The Brabanters m 1312, 1355 and 1415 and the Flemmgs m 1339 and 1482 did not
put aside monarchy as such, they looked for a regent when their pnnce had f led, and
recognized the legal heirs even if they were unmamed young women or minors But
m all these cases of a weakened pnncely power, they tned to put mto practice a very
similar political model m which the pnnce found himself bound on all sides And,
even more remarkably, the citizens managed fairly well m ruling their countnes durmg 'j
the penods of factual vacancy, and probably better than the pnnces, at least from the
subject's point of view
In fact, when the States General decided to "leave" the authonty of kmg Philip of
Spain m 1580, they immediately sought another pnnce to be their overlord28 It was
only the Calvinist Republic at Ghent that proclaimed the sovereignty of the city itself
in 1579 It is clear that most contemporanes could not think about states without a
pnnce29 The concept of Republicamsm found its roots in local authonty, m towns
with surroundmg hinterlands, m the Netherlands as well as m Switzerland and m Italy,
of course From there, it could be transferred, from the bottom up, to larger federa-
tions In this type of political System, local authorities were empowered to decide m all
matters, and only exphcit delegation enabled decision makmg on the higher levels of
the quarter, the prmcipality and the "Generality" In this respect, the Dutch Republic
was sohdly hnked with the mstitutional model elaborated in Flanders and Brabant
durmg centunes of Opposition agamst monarchs
The quick spread throughout the whole county of Flanders of the "new order" mau-
gurated by the Ghent Republic from 1578 onwards, and also in the most important
26
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cities m Brabant, Brussels, Mechelen and Antwerp, would have been impossible 'with-
out a preconceived model for the state orgamzation Both m Brabant and m Flanders,
this model was the city-state system, based on the supremacy of the the major cities
each m their quarter, as they had shaped it dunng the recurrent revolutionary penods
of the 14th and 15th centunes30 On the level of the prmcipahties, the capitals had
practised for centunes a system of consultations and collective confhct-solvmg
This was the model of the Northern Netherlands, and Holland especially had the
opportumty to develop further and to prove it was not at all obsolete It proved to be
perfectly adapted to highly urbamsed areas with the function of metropolis for the
world-economy, a position Holland took over from Flanders and Brabant at the end of
the 16th Century The communal, federative and constitutional model of a political
system, as it was carned to lts füllest expressions m Flanders and Brabant, could be
elaborated up to the level of the federaüon of the Seven Provmces It was mdebted to a
strong mstitutional tradition but the combmation with a core position m the world-
economy provided the means to stand up agamst the claims of surrounding monarch-
les One could even argue that a loosely structured state was a necessary condition for
the functiomng of a core m the pre-mdustnal capitalist world-economy
Faced with an immobile and increasingly inadequate legitimation of the monarchy,
the highly urbamsed provinces of the Netherlands could easily shift to their alternative
of a state orgamzation which they had been developing dunng nearly three centunes
of revolts and constitutionahsm It did not matter very much to them if they practised
it with or without a monarch, as long hè had no real power over them
30
 Although the major Brabantme towns did not reach the size of Bruges and Ghent before 1500,
and consequently were less powerful withm the context of the duchy, they equally tended to
control their "quarters" m jundical, economie and fiscal matters Ph Godding, Imperialisme ur-
bain ou auto-defense Ie cas de Bruxelles (12e—18e siecles), and R Van Uytven, Imperialisme of
zelfverdediging de extra-stedehjke rechtsmacht van Leuven, m Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis 58
(1975) 7-72 and 95-123
